Ten New York Times journalists pressed Prime Minister Mark Carney for about an hour on Wednesday, September 23, 2026, on a range of topics. On Saturday, September 27, the NY Times published a transcript of their conversation.

The journalists who participated were: Joseph Kahn, the executive editor; Kathleen Kingsbury, the opinion editor; Philip Pan, the international editor; Matina Stevis-Gridneff, the Canada bureau chief; Ezra Klein, an Opinion columnist and podcast host; Natalie Kitroeff, a host of “The Daily” podcast; David E. Sanger, a White House correspondent with expertise in national security and diplomacy; Tyler Pager, a White House reporter; Colby Smith, an economics reporter who covers the Federal Reserve; and Sydney Ember, an economics reporter.

Joseph Kahn

We just saw the actual text of the agreement with Greenland between the United States and Greenland. It looks a good deal like the security agreement that the United States had with Greenland right after World War II, and doesn’t appear to come very close to matching the rhetoric that President Trump attached to the whole effort. And it makes me wonder a bit, because so much of the battle, such as it is between the United States and Canada, seems to rely on the rhetoric coming from Trump. Do you imagine that something similar could come out of this heightened conflict between the two at the moment, or do you think it’s deeper, more serious than that, and actually will have some kind of permanent impact in relations?

Mark Carney

I wouldn’t mind not using Greenland as the analogue here, although I will concede that there are elements of the discussions, negotiations and the relationship over the last 18 months which have looked to impinge on Canadian sovereignty. The Greenland issue is obviously a series of sovereignty issues. There’s a history there, with which you are well familiar. Go through the fine-tooth comb of the agreement, and judge what actually changed and what was reaffirmed.

With respect to our discussions with the U.S. — have things changed? Yes, things have changed. There have been direct threats to our sovereignty, rhetorical, but efforts in negotiations that would have impinged on our economic sovereignty, which we would not accept.

Aspects that were termed as “irritants” by the U.S., which are fundamental rights in Canada — language rights, cultural rights — which were worked into a proposed agreement, and that was enough of a red line in and of themselves not to sign. Restrictions or potential restrictions on our ability to sign trade deals with other countries. You know Canada is, by our judgment, the most connected economy in the world. We have free trade agreements with 1.5 billion people. We expect that’ll be three billion by the end of this year. Maybe it’ll slip by a couple months, but we will get to that three billion number, so we don’t want our hands tied. We don’t want to ask permission to have trade deals with other economies, or we would like it reciprocal, which I don’t think would happen.

So those elements are still rhetorical, because they haven’t come into force, but there was more substance behind elements of the rhetoric. The other thing that’s changed, and it’s a judgment how long it endures, is that it’s the avowed policy of the U.S. government for all countries, to charge access to the U.S. market.

In some cases, that’s tariffs. It’s normally a combination of tariffs, investment commitments, changes to domestic policies as part of broad trade agreement requirements, and, as you move along that spectrum, you move into issues of sovereignty. So, from our perspective, we look at it in several ways.

The basic is there is a mutually advantageous trade deal to be had that can be built above and beyond, and we’ll negotiate in good faith for that, and we will sign that. Even though in some areas, it will be different from the trade agreement that we do have with the United States.

We do have a trade agreement with the United States, called U.S.M.C.A. It’s still in force. Congress hasn’t repealed it, and the U.S. has violated it. Those are the facts. But in a realpolitik way, there is something that can be negotiated, given the change in the U.S. stance commercially.

We do have very clear red lines, as you would expect, in terms of sovereignty, and the dynamics of this mean that those are more likely to be respected if and when there is an agreement.

But the other big lesson we take is twofold. One is we’ve got to build up our strength at home, and that’s what we’ve been doing. We’ll have a chance, maybe, to talk about that. And we have to diversify our partnerships abroad. And in diversifying those partnerships abroad, we are focusing particularly on strategic capabilities. In areas where our sovereignty can be impinged by any of the hegemons, in effect — critical minerals is a classic example for the U.S., what China attempted to do. Defence infrastructure is another example. Financial payments is an example. We have joined in sanctions on Russia, so we’re very conscious of where others could have leverage over us, and we’re looking to diversify in ways that reduce that leverage and obviously create commercial advantage. And once you see that, what we’re doing with others is pretty predictable.

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The whole transcript is available at on the NY Times, and is also archived.